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4.1  Introduction 
In 1986 the United States achieved fundamental income tax reform-some- 
thing that had generally been agreed to be impossible.’ Among the most im- 
portant of the changes made in the 1986 reforms were those affecting interna- 
tional  economic  relations.  Because of  the  growing  interdependence of  the 
world economy, the changes in the U.S. income tax that have occurred during 
the 1980s have affected foreigners as well as Americans 
This paper deals with two topics. After a brief description of  the changes 
made in 1981, section 4.2 describes briefly the salient features of the 1986 act 
and discusses the political economy of tax reform-how  “the impossible be- 
came the inevitable.”Z Section 4.3 examines those aspects of recent U.S. tax 
changes that directly affect foreigners most ~trongly.~  These include effects on 
international flows of trade and capital4 and  induced effects on foreign  tax 
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1.  Break and Pechman titled their  1975 book Federal Tax Reform: The Impossible Dream? 
Perhaps the most extreme statement of the proposition that tax reform was, indeed, impossible 
was the following statement from Witte (1985, 380): “There is nothing, absolutely nothing in the 
history or politics of  the income tax that indicates that any of  these schemes have the slightest 
hope of being enacted in the forms proposed” (emphasis in original). 
2.  Birnbaum and Murray (1987, 6) write, “In the early hours of the morning of May 7, tax 
reform completed the transformation from the impossible to the inevitable.” 
3.  I use the term “tax changes” rather than “tax reform” advisedly; not all the changes that have 
occurred qualify as reforms. 
4. Jun (1989) distinguishes three ways in which a country’s tax policy can affect that country’s 
international direct investment (and the techniques affecting investment): first, by  modifying the 
tax treatment of foreign-source income (tax rates, foreign tax credit, and deferral); second, by 
altering the relative before-tax profitability of  investment at home and abroad (tax rates, invest- 
ment tax credit, and depreciation allowances); and third, by affecting the relative cost of external 
financing in various countries (the deductibility of interest and withholding taxes on interest pay- 98  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
laws. It does not consider other ways in which changes in U.S. tax law have 
affected foreigners more indirectly: these include especially the fact that intel- 
lectual arguments for reform have been given increased attention and legiti- 
macy by U.S. tax ref~rm.~  Section 4.4 draws lessons for other countries from 
the discussion of international issues. 
4.2  The 1981 and 1986 Acts and the Political Economy of Reform 
4.2.1  The 1981 Act 
During the 1970s the United States suffered from historically high levels of 
inflation and from lagging saving, investment, and economic growth. Some 
have attributed poor investment performance to the interplay between inflation 
and an  income tax that makes no provisions for inflation adjustment in  the 
calculation of depreciation allowances. Rather than indexing the measurement 
of income from business and capital, however, Congress enacted an extremely 
generous system of  investment incentives consisting of  a 10 percent invest- 
ment tax credit (ITC) and rapidly accelerated depreciation. In  combination 
these incentives were roughly equivalent in real present value terms to imme- 
diate expensing (first-year write-off) of investment, at the rate of inflation pre- 
vailing at the time. Together with reductions in marginal tax rates intended to 
offset the effects of bracket creep resulting from prior inflation, these incen- 
tives created enormous budget deficits. 
4.2.2  The 1986 Act 
The 1986 reform of the U.S. income tax was far-reaching. The individual 
rate schedule, which had more than a dozen rates and a maximum rate of 50 
percent, was reduced to four rates, 15, 28, 33, and 28 percent.6  The corporate 
rate was reduced from 46 percent to 34 percent. Rate reduction was paid for 
by  a variety of  structural changes: elimination of  the investment tax credit, 
slight deceleration of  depreciation allowances, complicated  provisions  in- 
tended to make the timing of  the recognition of income and the deduction of 
expenses track economic reality more closely, taxation of  nominal capital 
gains as ordinary income, repeal of  the deductions for state and local sales 
taxes, and a multifaceted assault on tax  shelters, plus many less important 
ments). For present purposes it might be useful to add a fourth category, changes in the country's 
tax treatment of domestic-source income attributable to foreigners; this allows us also to consider 
effects on incoming investment. A11  of these channels of influence have been active in changes in 
U.S.  tax policy during the 198Os, for portfolio investment as well as for direct investment. In what 
follows they are noted in footnotes. 
5. This aspect of the question is discussed in a variety of places, including the papers in Boskin 
and McLure (1990). Whalley (1990a). Tanzi (1987), Bossons (1987, 1988), and Pechman (1988). 
McLure (1989~)  discusses lessons for developing countries from U.S. tax reform. 
6.  The peculiar blip in the rate structure results from provisions taking back the benefits of 
personal exemptions and the 15 percent rate for upper-middle-income taxpayers. 99  Tax Reform in the United States 
changes. Interestingly, many of the most important deviations of taxable in- 
come from economic income were not touched by tax reform. These include 
the deductions for interest on owner-occupied housing, the deduction for in- 
come and property taxes paid  to state and local governments, the tax-free 
status of health insurance and many other fringe benefits provided by employ- 
ers, and interest on securities issued by  state and local governments. Unlike 
the  provisions that  were  reformed,  these benefit primarily  middle-income 
households and are probably not generally viewed as loopholes. 
Notably absent from the  1986 act was  any attempt to reduce the federal 
budget  deficit;  rather,  the  1986  reforms  were  explicitly  intended  to  be 
revenue-neutra, that is, to yield neither more nor less revenue than prior law 
during the first five years after enactment. Given the effects of  the  1981 act 
described above, it is not surprising that many find this to be a major flaw in 
the 1986 act.’ The requirement of revenue neutrality is explained by President 
Ronald Reagan’s promise to veto any bill containing a tax increase. 
The public policy underpinnings of the 1986 act are fairly straightforward; 
for the most part they reflect the conventional wisdom of  a generation of ad- 
vocates of income tax reform. As Henry Aaron has written (1989, 9), “The 
remarkable characteristic of the debate leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 was how much the old concepts of equity and how little recent advances 
in  normative tax theory were invoked not only among politicians but  also 
among economists.” The objective of tax reform, as envisaged by the authors 
of  Treasury I, the Department’s 1984 report to President Reagan, which set 
the terms of  reference for the ensuing debate, was  to tax all real economic 
income uniformly and consistently, without regard to its source or use.8 It was 
believed that this would reduce both inequity and the perception of  inequity, 
allow lower rates, reduce distortions of economic decision making, and even 
make the system ~impler.~  Contrary to the expectations of  some, Treasury I 
did not contain a proposal to shift from the income tax to a direct tax based on 
consumption, the recent darling of economists. Such a proposal would almost 
certainly have been dead on amval if Reagan had submitted it to Congress. 
The decision to scale back investment incentives and reduce statutory tax 
rates, first advanced in Treasury I, has drawn criticism from some economists; 
they point out that this policy lowers taxes on old capital and raises taxes on 
new capital, thereby discouraging investment.  lo They seldom address several 
7. See, for example, Shoven (1990). 
8. I have explained this at  length in various places; see, for example, McLure (1986~)  and 
McLure and Zodrow (1987). 
9. It should be noted that simplicity goes beyond the complexity of tax rules and the difficulty 
of complying with them; it includes the question of “transactional simplicity.” A tax law that is 
complex may  simplify matters on balance by  preventing complicated transactions that are tax- 
motivated. See McLure (1989a). 
10.  See, for example, Shoven (1990). Shoven also decries the failure to reduce the favoritism 
toward owner-occupied housing, an omission that prevents the achievement of a “level playing 
field.”  Early in the tax reform process Reagan had declared the sanctity of the deduction for home 
mortgage interest. 100  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
key issues, including the desirability of  encouraging increases in investment 
not matched by  increased saving, the complexity and  the inequities-both 
real and perceived-of  tax shelters based on investment incentives, and the 
effects on the tax base of low statutory rates (to be considered below). 
A very different line of  criticism, associated primarily with Richard Mus- 
grave (1987), objects to the fact that the 1986 act sharply reduces the progres- 
sivity of income tax rates paid by individuals.” According to this line of rea- 
soning  it  would  have  been  preferable  to  combine  base  broadening  with 
substantially less reduction in  the progressivity of  rates. It seems, however, 
that this view is politically unrealistic, since such a proposal would never have 
seen the light of day if the Treasury Department had submitted it to the White 
House. 
Moreover, the 1986 act did not reduce the progressivity of  the income tax; 
that occurred in  1981. The 1986 act merely restored some of the horizontal 
equity and economic neutrality that had been lost in 1981 (and before). It did 
this through a distributionally neutral process of base broadening and rate re- 
duction. The combined effect of the 1981 and 1986 act was, however, to sub- 
stantially reduce the corporate income tax rate. That has international ramifi- 
cations to be examined in section 4.3. 
4.2.3  The Political Economy of ReformI2 
Luck-the  confluence  of  particular  circumstances and  personalities- 
played a large role in the passage of the Tax Reform Act of  1986. First, there 
was a strong and popular Republican president who detested high tax rates. 
Whether his understanding of  the objectives of tax reform went beyond rate 
reduction has been widely questioned. What matters is that he made tax re- 
form the number one item on his domestic agenda. It was especially important 
that Ronald Reagan was a Republican, since tax reform has commonly been a 
Democratic issue. (See the discussion of horizontal and vertical equity below.) 
Republicans, especially in the Senate, were called on to support their presi- 
dent’s plan for tax reform-and  did so-even  though they preferred to op- 
pose it. 
The role of  congressional “brokers” has also been emphasized. Two rela- 
tively young members of  Congress, Senator Bill Bradley, a Democrat from 
New  Jersey,  and  Congressman Jack Kemp, a Republican from New  York, 
both former professional athletes who had personal experience with the intri- 
cacies and insanity of the U.S. tax code, had both launched independent cam- 
paigns for tax reforms. Because of this and their expertise, they played a role 
in the tax reform process unusual for members of Congress with so little sen- 
iority. Moreover, they gave the quest for tax  reform a bipartisan character it 
might have lacked. 
11. This issue is discussed further in McLure (1990a). 
12. On this subject see especially Birnbaum and Murray (1987) and Conlan, Bean, and Wright- 
son (  1990). 101  Tax Reform in the United States 
Luck also played a role in  the staffing of  two important positions in the 
Reagan administration. When the tax reform process began, Donald Regan 
was secretary of the treasury and James Baker was chief of staff of the White 
House. Regan was willing to give the tax  professionals in the Treasury De- 
partment free rein to produce a politically pure proposal that would meet the 
objectives of  tax reform announced in Reagan’s 1984 state-of-the-union ad- 
dress. As a result, the Treasury Department proposal set a standard against 
which subsequent tax reform plans would be judged.  It seems unlikely that 
Baker, the consummate politician, would have done this had he been secretary 
of  the treasury. In early January 1985, after the release of  Treasury I, Baker 
and Regan changed jobs. This put Baker and his deputy secretary Richard 
Darman in a position to handle the delicate negotiations with Congress, some- 
thing Regan could never have achieved, and gave Regan ready access to the 
president where he could champion the cause of  tax reform-something  he 
had a psychological interest in doing, given his role in producing Treasury I. 
The press, especially the print media, played a crucial role in tax reform. 
The press reaction to tax reform seems to have gone through three stages. 
First, for a short period the “liberal Eastern press” seemed unable to believe 
that something as good as Treasury I could come from the Reagan administra- 
tion. Then they moved to characterizing the plan as “academic” and “intellec- 
tually pure” but “politically naive.” 
But as the process wore on, the press exhibited a clear if implicit view that 
tax reform should not die. Through its incessant ridicule of  those who at- 
tempted to  salvage the tax preferences that benefited special interests, the 
press helped turn politicians into statesmen. This is perhaps most clearly seen 
in  two instances. First, when bank lobbyists cried, “We won! We  won!” in 
response to a vote by the Ways and Means Committee that would have given 
banking  an enormous new  tax  break,  the media excoriated the committee 
members who had voted for the provision. Second, it began to call Bob Pack- 
wood, the chairman of  the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Hackwood. 
Partly because of the press, no one in Congress wanted to find the dead baby 
of tax reform on their doorstep. 
It is awkward for me to speculate on the role of  tax experts in explaining 
the success of tax reform, given my own participation in the process; I would 
naturally  like  to believe that  tax  experts played a significant r01e.I~  I will 
simply quote a few statements from a recently published book. 
[Tlhe initial Treasury I plan was an astonishingly pure expression of expert 
views. Although never formally proposed as legislation, it-rather  than the 
existing law-set  the standard against which subsequent proposals were 
measured. . . . [Tlhe ideas of tax professionals were less overtly dominant 
13. One is inevitably reminded of the famous passage from Keynes about the power of ideas. 
Once while discussing tax reform with Carl Shoup, I referred to  myself as an “academic scrib- 
bler.” Carl said that he thought his generation had been the academic scribblers. That raises the 
next question:  was I one of the “mad men in authority”? 102  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
through the remainder of  the legislative process.  . . . [B]y controlling the 
critical revenue estimates, the small band of professionals under JTC’s Da- 
vid  Brockway  exercise  life-and-death  power  over  countless  alterna- 
tives considered by decision makers. (Conlan, Bean, and Wrightson,  1990, 
The international context in which U.S. tax reform occurred played an im- 
portant role in explaining the early success of the reformers.I4 In early 1984, 
just as the basic outlines of the Treasury I program were being set, the United 
Kingdom announced a radical reform in which its corporate income tax rate 
would be reduced from 52 percent to 35 percent and the expensing of capital 
goods would be replaced with a return to conventional multiyear depreciation 
allowances. The reasons given for the British reform-particularly  avoiding 
distortion of  investment decisions-were  the  same as those used  to justify 
similar measures in the United States. These arguments-and  especially the 
fact that Nigel Lawson, the British chancellor of  the Exchequer,  had found 
them convincing-were  employed to assure Secretary Regan that the Trea- 
sury I strategy was sound. 
The strategy followed in producing Treasury I probably also contributed to 
the success of tax reform. First, Treasury I was produced in secret. There is 
no evidence that anyone outside the Treasury Department knew until the last 
few weeks before its release what Treasury I would contain. This strategy, 
which  allowed the president to claim truthfully  that he did not know  what 
would be in the Treasury proposals, helped assure the independence of the tax 
experts at Treasury and thus the intellectual purity of the plan. Had the White 
House known of the contents of Treasury I in advance, it is unlikely that purity 
could have been  maintained; this is especially true since leaks would have 
brought representatives of  special interests to the White House in droves to 
plead their cause. 
The fact that Walter Mondale made the politically  unwise decision to an- 
nounce during the  1984 presidential campaign that he would raise taxes vir- 
tually  assured that the formulation Treasury I could continue in secret. Had 
Mondale proposed a tax reform package patterned after that of Senator Brad- 
ley, it is likely  that the  president would  have countered and  in the process 
opened the public debate on tax reform before Treasury I became public. That 
would probably have doomed tax reform. 
Historically tax reform has been advocated by Democrats to alter the verti- 
cal equity of  the tax system-the  distribution of taxes across income brack- 
ets-by  increasing progressivity. Treasury I adopted an entirely different strat- 
egy based on horizontal equity. It took as a working hypothesis the proposition 
that tax reform should be distributionally neutral-that  it should not affect the 
243-44) 
14. This discussion concentrates on the role played by  the 1984 reforms in the United King- 
dom, which I know to have been important for the reasons stated in the text. It ignores the 1985 
Canadian proposals, which were in process before the release of Treasury I but were made more 
urgent by it. For further discussion, see Whalley (1990b). 103  Tax Reform in the United States 
distribution across income classes. Thus, rather than pitting rich against poor, 
it pitted those who paid their fair share of taxes, and more, against those who 
did not. Whereas it is difficult to argue objectively that the tax system should 
be either more or less progressive, it is much easier to argue that everyone 
with a certain real economic income should pay approximately the same tax. 
One component of any explanation of the success of tax reform must be the 
burgeoning of  tax shelters that occurred after passage of  the 1981 act.” The 
acceleration of depreciation allowances and the ITC provided by  the 1981 act, 
in conjunction with the deduction for nominal interest expense bloated by 
inflation, created enormous tax shelter activity despite the reduction in tax 
rates that occurred in 198  1. During the years immediately preceding passage 
of the 1986 act, the news media were full of stones about wealthy individuals 
and corporations paying little or no tax.I6 
Revenue neutrality-the  proposition that tax reform should neither raise 
nor lower taxes in the aggregate-also  proved to be politically important. It 
helped impose discipline on a Congress that would otherwise have used tax 
reform  as an opportunity to bestow tax  breaks,  without taking back  other 
breaks of equal value. 
Finally, Treasury I exhibited what might be called a whole-hog approach. 
With only a few exceptions (mortgage interest on owner-occupied housing 
and the exclusion of interest on municipal bonds) Treasury I took no hostages. 
That is, it attacked virtually every tax break on the books, including many 
sacred cows,  in  order  to  achieve as  much  rate  reduction  as possible  and 
thereby stir the interest of the American public. 
In the early stages of  their deliberations, both tax  writing committees at- 
tempted a different and a more traditional approach, preserving some prefer- 
ences and creating others. Ultimately, however, during a now-famous long 
lunch, Packwood saw the basic good sense of  the Treasury I approach. By 
being much more ambitious in its base broadening, his committee was able to 
achieve far more rate reduction that might have been thought possible. 
15. Bimbaum and Murray (1987, 10) write, “The phenomenal rise in tax shelters was a central 
part of the problem.” Tax shelters occur when artificial accounting losses in one activity are used 
to offset income from other activities, such as that from employment or the exercise of a business 
or profession.  Tax  shelters result from the combination of  accelerated deduction of expenses, 
postponement of  the recognition of  income,  preferential taxation of  income realized as capital 
gains, deductions of nominal interest expense, and high marginal rates. 
16. Birnbaum and Murray (1987, 127) note the concern of Dan Rostenkowski, chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, that his daughters paid more income tax than some million- 
aires. According to a U.S. Treasury Department study (1985), in 1983 some thirty thousand tax- 
payers with incomes (before deduction of tax shelter losses) in excess of $250,000 paid less than 
5 percent of  such income in taxes. 
17. This is not to say that the 1986 act achieved a tax base that approached the comprehensive- 
ness of the Treasury I plan. For example, whereas Treasury I would have eliminated the deduction 
for all state and local taxes and would have taxed fringe benefits much more heavily, the 1986 act 
eliminates only the deduction for sales taxes, hardly touches fringe benefits, and makes up the 
revenue by  a truly  draconian  assault on tax  shelters that might accurately be  characterized as 
retroactive. 104  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
One extremely  important difference  between  the  1986 act  and  its  1981 
counterpart  should be mentioned. In  198  1  there were essentially  no losers; 
different  industries received  larger  or smaller tax  cuts, but  virtually  all re- 
ceived some benefit.  By comparison, in  1986 there were both  winners and 
losers. Indeed, because there was a large shift in tax liability from individuals 
to corporations, there were some big losers. Even so, there were enough busi- 
ness winners that it was never possible to put together a “killer coalition” of 
business interests. Rather, Darman and others put together effective coalitions 
of industries that would benefit from reform that were strong enough to help 
assure the passage of tax reform. 
Public perceptions about tax reform were interesting,  not to say puzzling. 
Under the Treasury I proposal there would have been two winners for every 
loser,  as measured  by changes in  individual tax liabilities.  This was true  in 
part because there was a large shift in liabilities from individuals to corpora- 
tions, and the increase in corporate taxes was not attributed to the individuals 
that  would  pay them. Yet.  throughout  the tax  reform process a majority of 
those questioned  in  surveys  consistently  thought  they  would  lose from tax 
reform. At no time was there a public ground swell in favor of tax reform. At 
best, the public looked on tax reform with indifference; at worst it was hostile. 
Presumably this reflected  some combination of  ignorance of  the contents of 
the tax reform program and distrust of Congress; it is unlikely that individuals 
were factoring in the increase in corporate burdens. 
4.3  International Implications of Tax Reform 
Most of  the remainder of this paper is devoted to examination of  the inter- 
national implications of changes in the U.S. income tax that occurred in 1981 
and 1986. The Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of  1980 and the 
1984 repeal of the 30 percent withholding tax on most portfolio interest paid 
to foreigners are discussed more briefly. Finally, I mention briefly an issue that 
epitomizes the problems created by international economic interdependence, 
though  it  does not  involve  federal  tax  reform;  this  is  unitary  taxation,  the 
method some of  the American  states use to tax the income of multijurisdic- 
tional corporations.  I end with speculations about the need for, and the pros- 
pects of, international arrangements to reduce the increased tax competition 
resulting from both increasing economic interdependence and the changes in 
U.S.  tax laws discussed earlier. 
4.3.1  International Implications of the 1981 Act 
It seems clear in retrospect that those responsible for the  1981 act did not 
pay  adequate  attention  to the  international  implications of  what  they  were 
doing.  l8 A bidding war between  the Republican and Democrats, rather than 
18. This argument is developed at greater length in McLure (1990b) 105  Tax Reform in the United States 
rational analysis, explains the generosity of the investment provisions. l9 Only 
later was it widely realized that an increase in  investment stimulated by tax 
incentives that is not matched by an equal increase in saving and, indeed, is 
aggravated by a large increase in public dissaving, would necessarily generate 
an inflow of  foreign capital  needed to finance the excess investment.20 The 
capital inflow must, of necessity,  be mirrored  in  a deterioration of the U.S. 
trade balance. This would be achieved by appreciation of the dollar-a  devel- 
opment that would make imports more attractive to American consumers and 
exports less attractive to foreign purchasers.  In short, investment incentives 
would hurt the short-run competitiveness of American industry.21  Sinn (1991, 
1) states the issue as follows: 
An obvious sign of confusion is the popular belief that a policy that makes 
a country attractive for internationally mobile capital will simultaneously 
improve  this country’s competitiveness  in international trade. Of course, 
with  flexible exchange rates, this cannot be true since the capital import 
equals the current account deficit: The investors’ attempt to import capital 
will be successful only to the extent that it leads to a revaluation and thereby 
to a deterioration of  the current account. The confusion is shared by coun- 
tries that take pride in being world export champions without realizing that 
they  could  equally  well  regard  themselves  as capital  flight  champions. 
Economists have warned of such types of irrationality. 
The 1981 act clearly could not affect only the United  States. Sinn (1987, 
224-25)  notes: 
The first half of the eighties was characterized by enormous capital imports 
into the  United  States accompanied  by  a strong dollar and a high  world 
interest rate level. Most countries suffered from this situation. Europe was 
driven into the worst recession of  the post-war period,  and the developing 
countries were shaken by one debt crisis after another. A number of coun- 
tries were unable to meet their interest obligations,  and a collapse of the 
world banking  system was avoided only by strenuous efforts. The United 
States alone seemed to have benefited: despite the high interest rate it en- 
joyed a significant consumption and investment boom. 
Sinn goes on to observe: “A potential explanation of  the development of the 
world economy that fits all of the facts mentioned could be the Accelerated 
19.  See Rudder (1983, 205-6)  and Witte (1985, 221-35).  This experience is summarized in 
McLure (1989a). 
20.  This case is an example of the second of the channels of influence identified by Jun (1989). 
It  appears that Summers (1988) is one of  the  first explicit recognitions of this proposition, so 
obvious in retrospect; see also Bernheim (1988, 3-51, Sinn (1987. 224-31)  provides a masterful 
exposition of this proposition. 
21.  The concept of competitiveness used here. the ability to compete with imports and to ex- 
port,  is a crude one that does not necessarily make much  sense; but  it is the one that seems to 
permeate discussions of public policy. Slemrod (1991),  besides noting the faults of this definition, 
argues for defining competitiveness as the ability to maintain (or increase) a nation’s level of real 
income in the presence of competition from abroad. 106  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
Cost Recovery System (ACRS) introduced by the Reagan Administration in 
1981 .” He concludes: “[Tlhere cannot be much doubt that ACRS caused one 
of the most severe disturbances of the world economy ever induced by a tax 
reform.” 
4.3.2  International Implications of  the 1986 Act 
Like the 1981 act, the 1986 act has had important effects on international 
trade and capital flows. Moreover, it has induced foreign governments to alter 
their tax policies.  By eliminating  the investment tax credit and reducing the 
speed with which depreciation allowances can be taken, it has reduced incen- 
tives for investment in the United States.z2  This may tend to reverse the excess 
of investment over saving, capital inflows, depreciation of  the dollar, difficul- 
ties exporting, and competition from imports noted earlier. 
It is interesting to note that discussions  of the international effects of tax 
reform that occurred during the two years preceding passage of  the 1986 act 
reflected  only a rudimentary and incomplete  understanding  of  such effects. 
Those arguing in favor of retention of investment incentives contended that 
such incentives were necessary to maintain the competitiveness of American 
industry. They seemed not to understand that, if saving cannot be increased, 
encouraging investment undermines the competitive position of U.S. industry 
in the short run, for reasons outlined above, no matter how positive the effects 
might be in the long run. 
Several provisions of the 1986 act, most notably the reduction in corporate 
rates, the change in “sourcing” rules, and the tighter limitations on the foreign 
tax credit, can be expected to have extremely important international impli- 
cation~.~~  The reduction in corporate rates has converted the United States into 
a tax haven in some respects. In particular, multinational firms based in many 
countries employing the territorial principle will find it attractive to invest in 
the United States or to manipulate  transactions to attribute as much of  their 
income as possible to the United States, in order to have it taxed at the rate of 
34 percent, which is one of the lowest in the world. Even corporations based 
in countries employing residence  taxation with foreign tax credit limitations 
calculated on an overall basis may find it attractive to attribute income to the 
United States, in order to be able to average low-tax U.S. income with high- 
tax income earned in other 
Multinational corporations may also have  an incentive to shift borrowing 
from the United  States to other countries, in order to benefit  from interest 
deductions  at  the  higher rates  prevailing  there,  rather  than the  lower  U.S. 
22.  This is an example of Jun’s second channel of  influence. 
23. These are examples of Junk first channel of  influence. 
24. Slemrod (1991) notes that Japan has enacted provisions intended to restrict the possibility 
of offsetting high-tax income against low-tax income under its system of overall limitation on the 
foreign tax credit. 107  Tax Reform in the United States 
rate.25  Such a shift could have important effects on the distribution of tax rev- 
enues among nations. This has apparently been an important determinant of 
Canada’s decision to reduce its corporate tax rate in response to the American 
rate reduction.26 
The United States has long been worried about the incentive effects created 
by  the use of  an overall limitation on the foreign tax  The overall 
limitation can create an incentive for corporations to move business to low- 
tax jurisdictions, in order to offset taxes paid in high-tax jurisdictions. Alter- 
natively, if  they have adequate low-tax income, they can invest in high-tax 
jurisdictions without actually bearing the burden of such higher taxes.28  Those 
responsible for U.S. tax  reform realized that the proposed rate reductions 
would aggravate this problem: rate reduction would reduce the ability of U.S. 
corporations to take full credit for tax paid to foreign countries, and thus in- 
crease incentives to shift income to low-tax  jurisdiction^.^^ 
Various approaches have been proposed to deal with this problem. For ex- 
ample, the U.S. Treasury Department (1984, 2:361) and President Reagan’s 
1985 tax reform proposals to the Congress (p. 389) recommended shifting to 
a per-country limitation on the foreign tax credit. The 1986 act took a different 
approach. It retained the overall limitation but expanded the use of  separate 
“baskets.” In particular, there are separate baskets for ordinary operating in- 
come, for passive income, and for income that is commonly subject to low 
rates, such as that from financial services and shipping income. Moreover, it 
provided  for a “high-rate kick-out”; interest income subject to high  gross 
withholding taxes cannot be  comingled with passive income subject to low 
tax rates. These rules have greatly increased the complexity of the tax system 
for U.S.  multinational corp~rations.~~  Most will be  forced to classify their 
income into at least three baskets, operating, passive, and high-tax interest. 
The reduction in rates, tighter sourcing rules, and greater use of  separate 
baskets will have important international ramifications. In  particular, many 
more American firms will have excess foreign tax credits-taxes  paid to for- 
25.  This is an example of Jun’s third channel of influence. It involves a change in the relative 
26.  This has been emphasized in Bossons (1987, 1988). See also Whalley (1990b). 
27.  The United States allows U.S. multinationals credit for taxes paid to foreign governments, 
but only up  to the amount of  U.S. tax that would be  paid on such foreign-source income.  It 
employs an “overall limitation,” under which the income earned in all foreign countries and the 
taxes attributed thereto are combined in calculating the limitation on the credit. 
28.  See the example in U.S. Department of the Treasury (1984, 2:360-61),  and The Presi- 
dent’s Tar Proposals (1985, 387). 
29.  See The President’s Tar Proposals (1985,387). Because the 1986 act contains a 34 percent 
corporate rate, there is an enormous shift of  tax burden from individuals to corporations. Under 
an alternative reform that would have left corporate liabilities unchanged, the corporate rate might 
have been reduced to as low as 28 percent. See Birnbaum and Murray (1987, 59). Under such a 
change excess foreign tax credits would be even more prevalent. 
30.  On the complexity of the post-1986 U.S. taxation of  multinational corporations, see Tillin- 
ghast (1990). 
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eign governments in excess of what can be credited in the United States. As 
long as the United States had relatively high tax rates and liberal sourcing and 
averaging rules, foreign governments could operate under an umbrella created 
by the U.S. foreign tax credit: they could, on average, levy tax rates as high 
as those in the United States without fear that U.S. taxpayers investing within 
their jurisdiction would actually bear the burden of local taxes. Now that many 
more U.S.  multinationals  are in  an excess credit position,  the  umbrella  is 
shredded; it will be much  more common that the investors, rather than the 
U.S.  Treasury, will pay  taxes levied by  source countries.  The result  is that 
conditions now resemble more closely what they would be if the United States 
employed a territorial system. 
One obvious result of this change in U.S.  tax policy has been pressure on 
foreign governments to reduce their own tax rates. Explicit recognition of this 
is nowhere expressed more clearly than in the Colombian income tax reform 
passed at the end of 1986. Article 44 of that law provides the government the 
power to change the tax rates applied to income of foreigners in the light of 
changes being made in the income taxes of resident  countries of foreigners 
investing in Colombia (the most important of which is the United States); the 
provision mentions specifically changes in the availability of foreign tax cred- 
its. This power has since been exercised; whereas the withholding  rate was 
initially raised from 20 percent to 30 percent when the income tax rate was 
reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent (producing a combined rate of 5  1 per- 
cent on income distributed to foreigners, compared to 52 percent under prior 
law), it has since been reduced to 20 percent. 
There may be few cases as clear as this one. But there is no doubt that tax 
rates have been falling around the world. Table 4.1 reports tax rates before 
Table 4.1  Tax Rates in Selected Countries, before and after Tax Reform 
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Source: Charles E. McLure, Jr., “Appraising Tax Reform,” in Boskin and McLure (1990, 282). 
’Assumes scheduled elimination of surcharge at the end of  1989. 
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and after tax reforms in selected countries. Whalley (1990a) also documents 
the movement toward lower tax  Sinn (1990, 1) writes, “The current 
world economy seems to be going through a phase of increased tax competi- 
tion.” Of course, it has been necessary to expand tax bases, often by reducing 
investment incentives, in  order to lower rates without sacrificing revenues. 
Thus it seems that U.S. tax reform has helped encourage the tax reform move- 
ment that has swept the world in recent years. 
Though this is undoubtedly a welcome development to many  of  those in- 
volved in the process of U.S. tax reform, especially the conservatives in the 
Reagan White House, there is little reason to believe that worldwide tax re- 
form was a conscious, high-priority objective of  those most responsible for 
advocacy and design of the U.S. reform. They were primarily interested in 
improving the American system; the reform of other systems is an unexpected 
if welcome bonus. 
4.3.3  Other Tax Changes 
The Repeal of  Withholding on Interest32 
During  the  early  1980s substantial American  attention  was  focused on 
treaty shopping, the unanticipated and improper use of treaties between the 
United States and another country to gain the benefits of the treaty for a resi- 
dent of a third country. Primary attention focused on the Netherlands Antilles, 
where American corporations would establish finance subsidiaries that would 
borrow  in the Eurodollar market and then relend to their American parents 
without paying the withholding tax on interest that would be due in the case 
of direct borrowing from Europe. 
The degree of  international interdependence is shown by the fact that the 
United States did not merely repeal its treaty with the Netherlands Antilles or 
amend it to outlaw this abuse. Rather, the United States repealed its withhold- 
ing tax on most portfolio interest paid to f0reigne1-s.~~  (There had long been 
no withholding tax on interest on bank accounts.) This route was chosen be- 
cause of  fears that simply repealing the treaty would cause an unacceptable 
increase the cost of  funds to American corporations. This, in turn, is true 
because there is very little source-based taxation of  interest in  Europe.% Of 
course,  the  virtual elimination of  source-based taxation of  interest by  the 
United States makes it even less likely that any other country will attempt such 
31.  Whalley (1990a) notes that New Zealand reduced its top individual rate from 66 percent to 
32. This section draws on McLure (1989d). 
33. This is an  example of Jun’s third channel of influence. 
34.  When West Germany attempted to introduce a modest withholding tax on interest in 1989 
there was such a large exodus of capital to other European countries that the measure had to be 
repealed. This episode provides evidence that  the taxation of interest income is being evaded, 
since the withholding tax would have been creditable against final liability. 
33 percent and its corporate rate from 45 to 33 percent. 110  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
taxation; indeed, it increases the likelihood of further reductions of such taxes 
by other countries. 
Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act 
American response was quite different in another area, the taxation of cap- 
ital gains on U.S. real estate. In 1980 the United States enacted the Foreign 
Investment in Real Property Tax  Act (FIRPTA). It modified the normal tax 
treatment of capital gains realized by foreigners-exemption-to  treat gains 
on real estate as taxable income.35  This legislation reflected a variety of polit- 
ical pressures, most notably the concern that foreign investors benefiting more 
from favorable tax treatment than did Americans were bidding up the price of 
U.S. real estate. 
Comparison 
It  is fascinating to compare the American reaction  to  greater economic 
interdependence in these two areas. In the case of  interest, source-based tax- 
ation was reduced in order to avoid repelling capital inflows or raising the cost 
of capital to American business. In the case of real estate the stance of public 
policy was just the opposite; taxes on capital gains were raised in  order to 
prevent capital inflow-or  at least make it less attractive. Whether this objec- 
tive is realized depends on the treatment of such gains and taxes thereon in the 
country of residence of the foreign investor (territorial, residence with credit, 
etc.). 
Unitary Taxation36 
The states in the United States employ formulas to apportion the income of 
multistate corporations among themselves. If  several affiliated corporations 
are deemed to be engaged in a unitary business, their incomes and apportion- 
ment factors are “combined” by  some states for purposes of  determining the 
income attributable to the state. The idea is that “separate accounting” applied 
to the activities of  the individual corporations cannot adequately determine 
the division of income between the firms, and thus the geographic source of 
income. This is true because of the possibility that transfer prices are manip- 
ulated and because economic interdependence may be so great that it is con- 
ceptually impossible for separate accounting to give an accurate division of 
income between affiliated firms. In some states this approach is carried to its 
logical conclusion in “worldwide unitary combination,” under which the in- 
come and economic activities of all affiliated firms deemed to be engaged in a 
unitary business are combined, no matter where the firms do business. 
This approach has proven to be extremely unpopular with foreign govern- 
ments, as well as with both domestic and foreign multinational corporations. 
35.  This is an example of the fourth channel of influence added to Jun’s list. 
36.  This section draws on much of my work on unitary taxation, the most important of which 
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There has thus been a general retreat to “water’s-edge combination ,” under 
which only U. S.  source income is apportioned. 
This result is somewhat ironic, given the growing interdependence of  the 
world economy. One would expect that as economic integration proceeds in 
Europe the economic interdependence of  affiliated corporations will become 
so great that formula apportionment will be needed.37  Of course, there is no 
reason to expect that worldwide combination would be attempted. 
On the other hand, it is entirely possible that the growing economic inter- 
dependence of  the world will make separate accounting increasingly unten- 
able everywhere. It is said that the determination, defense, and policing of 
transfer pricing is imposing a rapidly increasing burden on corporations and 
tax administrators in the United States. While the United States may be able 
to cope with these problems satisfactorily, many countries cannot; this is es- 
pecially true of LDCs. It would not be surprising to see a movement to the use 
of formulas to divide income among nations.38 
4.4  Lessons 
This review of  the international implications of  U.S. tax policy provides 
two kinds of  lessons. The first are lessons for other countries acting unilater- 
ally and in their own interest. The lessons for individual countries are fairly 
straightforward and have been anticipated by  the foregoing discussion; they 
are simply stated with little elaboration, except to note that they would be 
modified if there were greater international tax cooperation. By far the more 
interesting implications are those for the international community of nations; 
they involve the need for greater cooperation in tax policy.  I deal with them at 
greater length, but not really satisfactorily. 
4.4.1  Lessons for Other Countries 
Countries that wish to compete effectively in world markets would do well 
not to increase investment more rapidly than saving; this is something that 
economists working in developing countries have known for years, but the 
United States learned only in the 1980s, if at all. 
Countries that want to attract investment from the United States would be 
well-advised to pay  attention to the foreign tax credit position of  potential 
investors. If such firms have excess foreign tax credits, the taxes of the source 
country will burden  the investor, as under a territorial system, and not be 
borne by  the U.S. Treasury. In general, countries would do well to keep their 
statutory corporate tax rates below the American corporate rate, and that may 
not even be low enough, due to the working of  the overall limitation on the 
foreign tax credit. 
37.  For a more detailed statement of this position, see McLure (1989b). 
38.  For discussions of  this possibility, see Carlson and Galper (1984) and Kopits and Muten 
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The elimination of U.S. taxation on virtually all interest income suggests 
that other countries may be well advised to reduce their own taxation of  in- 
come from business and capital, in order to prevent capital outflows. At the 
very least, it might be appropriate to exempt interest income of residents from 
tax.39 A more extreme approach would be to replace the income tax with a 
direct tax based on con~umption.~~  Of course, that policy involves questions 
that go far beyond the scope of this paper.41 
Multinational companies have opportunities to chose where to borrow and 
to manipulate transfer prices in order to minimize their taxes. This also sug- 
gests that other countries will do well to avoid statutory rates above the U.S. 
corporate rate. Moreover, it suggests that they may even want to think of using 
a form of unitary taxation, both to prevent abuses and to get around the prob- 
lems inevitably posed by economic interdependence with a group of affiliated 
firms-problems  that will become even more acute for tax administration as 
international interdependence increases. 
4.4.2 
The picture painted above-including  the lessons for countries acting uni- 
laterally-is  not a pretty one; it is one of intensified tax competition that can 
be prevented only by international cooperation. As Razin and Sadka (1989,4) 
wrote in a recent NBER working paper, “If there is not sufficient coordination 
with the rest of the world to allow each country to tax its residents on their 
income from capital in the rest of the world, then tax competition leads to no 
tax whatsoever on capital income.” 
Some would find this development to be a positive one; presumably most 
advocates  of  consumption-based  direct  taxes  would  fall  in  this  camp,  as 
would less-principled  advocates of  greater capital formation. This is not the 
place  to enter that debate.  I  will  simply take  as given the need  to prevent 
wholesale tax competition, for whatever reason, and ask what kinds of coop- 
eration would  be needed  to achieve this end.42  The discussion that follows 
reflects the last three lessons for individual countries given above.43 
Lessons for the Community of Nations 
39.  I do not consider the possibility that residence countries will adopt the worldwide taxation 
of interest where it does not now exist; I consider that a futile gesture in the absence of far-reaching 
international cooperation of the type discussed below. 
40.  McLure  (1989d)  suggests  this  approach. McLure et al.  (1990,  chap. 9)  and  McLure 
(1990a) discuss whether the United States would allow foreign tax credits for such a tax, noting 
that the development of excess foreign tax credits by many American multinationals reduces the 
importance of the issue. 
41.  See, however, McLure et al. (1990, chap. 9) or Zodrow and McLure (forthcoming). 
42.  On the costs of  international tax competition, see Musgrave (1990), Slemrod (1990), and 
Sinn (1990). The primary reason for favoring the taxation of income from capital is the regressiv- 
ity of failing to do so. Musgrave relies heavily on the view that source countries are “entitled” to 
taxes on income, whereas Sinn notes an insurance motive for preventing tax competition. The 
need  to end tax  competition  is especially grave for LDCs and  for countries in the process of 
emerging from socialism. It may be worth noting explicitly that I have advocated tax competition 
among subnational governments as a way of  assuring that citizens get something of value from 
their governments; see McLure (1986b). 
43.  For similar suggestions, see Slemrod (1990, 21-22).  Bird (1988) and Bird and McLure 
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First, it would be appropriate to keep statutory corporate tax rates within a 
fairly narrow band-or  at least above an  agreed lower bound. This would 
protect all countries from destructive tax competition. Second, withholding 
taxes should be levied on all passive income paid to foreigners. Such taxes 
could be final taxes, with revenues retained by  the source country, or credit- 
able against tax liability in the taxpayer’s country of  residence (in which case 
revenues would be remitted to the residence country); alternatively, revenues 
could be split between source and residence countries. Third, countries not 
agreeing to the above two rules of  the game would be designated as tax ha- 
vens. Amounts paid to persons residing in them  (including “letterbox per- 
sons”) would be subject to full withholding, without the benefit of crediting. 
The fourth possible lesson is even more controversial than the above three. It 
involves the adoption of  some variant of unitary taxation, at least within the 
EC, and perhaps by all countries. 
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COmment  Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
This is a very valuable survey paper on the experience of the U.S.  tax reform 
and its implication for the other countries. Obviously, the United States is the 
most influential country in the world. Thus, it has a special value for the other 
countries. One interesting and useful element of  this paper is that Charles 
McLure presents his personal opinions in several cases. This reflects the fact 
that McLure was at one time an insider of  the U.S. tax reform. Therefore, 
readers can learn some insider stories. My comments are largely addressed to 
his opinions. 
First, McLure attributes the big increase in investment to investment tax 
credit (ITC) and accelerated depreciation allowances in the 198 1 tax reform. 
In other words, tax reform was quite effective for increasing investment activ- 
ity in the United States. This opinion was advocated by  Hans-Werner Sinn, 
and McLure supports the opinion to a greater extent. No  serious empirical 
evidence, however, is described in this paper. It is possible to guess that there 
Toshiaki Tachibanaki is professor of economics at Kyoto University. 116  Charles E. McLure, Jr. 
must be some other important reasons for explaining the increase in invest- 
ment, such as sales increases, profit increases, and others. It would be neces- 
sary to report some empirical support of the investment behavior in the United 
States in view of McLure’s emphasis on the increase in investment due to tax 
policy. 
Second, McLure suggests that the big  increase in investment  is the main 
cause of the U.S.  investment-savings imbalance.  I do not deny the effect. It 
seems to me,  however,  that  excess  consumption  (or  lower  saving) of  the 
American people and/or huge government deficits have been more responsible 
for the U.S.  investment-savings imbalance than  the increase in investment. 
This is my personal opinion. 
Third, McLure says that tax may affect the degree of competitiveness of 
the industry. Some people propose that a decrease in the corporate tax rate or 
an increase in ITC is recommended in order to improve competitiveness. Ac- 
cording to the careful international comparison among four countries, namely 
the  United  Kingdom, Sweden, West Germany,  and the United  States, per- 
formed by  King and Fullerton,’ the correlation between productivity  (or in- 
vestment  activity) and tax burden is inverse. In other words,  countries that 
levy higher taxes have higher productivities or investment activities. Thus, it 
may be difficult to believe a strong effect of tax on competitiveness. Competi- 
tiveness is determined by factors other than the tax factor. This may be again 
my personal opinion. 
Fourth, McLure points out the necessity  of international tax coordination 
particularly in the field of corporate tax rates,  the “sourcing”  rule, and the 
limitation of the foreign tax credit. I agree with him because it is important to 
avoid tax competition or tax war among nations.  In other words,  a country 
should leam from the experience of  other countries.  McLure points out the 
possibility of broadening the tax base in the United States, namely, a shift to a 
tax  based  on consumption  rather  on  income. However,  tax  reform  in  the 
United States failed to have such a shift. In view of the experiences in most of 
the industrialized nations where a VAT  or a tax based  on consumption was 
introduced, the United States may have to learn from the experiences in the 
other industrialized countries.  Otherwise,  the United States may be isolated 
from the world trend. If  tax coordination is important as suggested by Mc- 
Lure, the time has come to consider such a tax in the United States. 
The comments here were largely my personal reactions to the opinions ad- 
dressed by McLure. Needless to say, they do not dispute the quality and use- 
fulness of this paper at all. 
1. Mervyn A. King and Don Fullerton, eds., The Taration of  Income from Capitul (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984). 